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There is no winning! Only degrees of losing!
Danny DeVito as Gavin D'Amato1
I. Introduction
Although divorce rates have declined in recent decades, it is estimated that
40% of marriages in the United States end in divorce.2 A related social concern
affecting American families is the high "prevalence of domestic violence
among intimate partners. 3 Studies on domestic violence reveal that between
8% and 12% of women are victims of domestic abuse and that "women who are
separated or divorced are far more likely to have experienced domestic
violence.",4 As a result, claims of domestic abuse and marital misconduct
appear in a number of divorce cases.
In the past, evidence of tortious conduct was an integral part of a divorce
proceeding because it formed the basis upon which a divorce was granted and
influenced the distribution of assets and determination of support awards.
Interestingly enough, it has been suggested that much of early divorce law was
an outgrowth of tort law concepts. 6 The widespread shift to no-fault divorce
meant that many spouses seeking redress for wrongs that occurred during the
marriage had to turn elsewhereT7-the law of torts. Transferring claims of
marital misconduct from divorce proceedings into tort suits has not been
without its problems. Courts and legislatures have struggled to decide
1. THE WAR OF THE ROSES (Gracie Films 1989).
2. Mary Leonard, A Familiar Look to US Families Census Bureau Sees Move to the
"Traditional", BOSTON GLOBE, May 28, 1998, at Al.
3. Susan Wilt & Sarah Olson, Prevalence of Domestic Violence in the United States, J.
AM. MED. WOMEN's ASS'N, May-July 1996, at 77, 81.
4. Id.
5. See infra Part III.A (discussing the traditional fault-based system of divorce).
6. See HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNrED STATES
409 (2d ed. 1988) ("The divorce decree thus came to resemble a tort judgment, both being
granted for the fault of the defendant causing harm to the plaintiff, and both being denied where
the plaintiff either consented or was himself at fault.").
7. See infra Part III.B (discussing the evolution of no-fault divorce and its consequences
for abused spouses).
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"whether... a particular grievance should be handled within the context of the
family law system, rather than bringing a separate tort claim.",
8
This Note examines whether family law or tort law should be primarily
responsible for compensating the victim of marital misconduct. More
specifically, who loses under a regime that compensates for harms during the
marriage in tort rather than divorce? Part II of this Note elaborates on the
consequences of considering tortious conduct in a separate lawsuit rather than
in conjunction with the divorce through illustrative cases employing the two
alternatives. 9 These cases also demonstrate how tort principles are modified on
the basis of the parties' marital status.10
Part III of this Note provides a brief background of the relevant
developments in divorce and interspousal torts. The major development in
twentieth-century divorce law was the shift from the traditional fault-based
systems to the no-fault systems that currently predominate in the United
States.l" The eradication of the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity, which
prevented spouses from suing each other until the mid-i 900s, introduced the
opportunity to redress injuries inflicted during marriage through tort law. 12
The American Law Institute recommends that divorce proceedings remain
free of any consideration of fault, leaving the parties to resort to the law of
torts.13 However, the intersection of independent interspousal tort claims and
no-fault divorce proceedings generates a multitude of obstacles for the
individual parties and the courts, an issue discussed in Part IV of this Note.
14
Many of these problems are procedural-concerning the applicable statute of
limitations, joinder, and res judicata.15 Financial limitations raise additional
8. Robert G. Spector, Marital Torts: The Current Legal Landscape, 33 FAM. L.Q. 745,
748 (1999).
9. See infra Part II (discussing four cases in which torts were committed in romantic
relationships).
10. See infra Part II (comparing a tort case between spouses with a tort case between
cohabitants).
11. See infra Part III.A-B (discussing features of both systems and reasons for the
transition).
12. See infra Part III.C (discussing the justifications for interspousal tort immunity and
the reasons it was abolished).
13. See infra Part IV.A (discussing the rationales for the American Law Institute's
proposal).
14. See infra Part IV.B-C (discussing the procedural and financial difficulties of
separating tort claims from divorce proceedings).
15. See infra Part IV.B.1-3 (discussing the nature of the procedural problems and the
approaches adopted to resolve them).
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obstacles, particularly when the tortfeasor is not as economically stable as the
injured party.
16
Part V evaluates the American Law Institute's recommendation by
exploring the adequacy of current tort law to compensate victims of marital
misconduct. This Part examines how successfully tort law provides relief for
three of the most common marital wrongs-assault and battery, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and adultery. 17 This Note then considers the
realities of civil litigation to assess whether filing multiple suits is a viable
option.
18
A number of alternatives that may compensate victims more adequately
than the proposal offered by the American Law Institute are recommended in
Part VI. These alternatives include reforming divorce law to provide for
limited consideration of fault or reforming tort law to address harms that are
unique to the marital relationship. 19 Ultimately, this Note concludes that
integration of alternative dispute resolution methods to resolve the tort claims
brought in connection with divorce actions is the most attractive option.2°
Finally, Part VII offers some concluding remarks.
11. Illustrations
The problem generated by removing fault from the property distribution
equation at divorce and relying on tort law to compensate spouses is best
illustrated through a handful of cases. Part II discusses four cases resolving
claims of misconduct between couples. The first case depicts a situation in
which the trial court takes into account the fault of one party when determining
the appropriate distribution of property in a divorce proceeding. 21 The second
case addresses the merits of an independent tort suit brought by a spouse after
16. See infra Part IV.C (discussing the additional difficulties that separate tort suits pose
when the tortfeasor is not the primary wage-earner).
17. See infra Part V.A-C (discussing the potential theories of recovery for these three
types of misconduct and evaluating the ability of tort law to provide relief).
18. See infra Part V.D (discussing effects of double litigation on a spouse's ability to
recover damages).
19. See infra notes 198-206 and accompanying text (suggesting reforms in substantive
law).
20. See infra notes 207-18 and accompanying text (suggesting a method for integrating
arbitration into contentious divorce proceedings and discussing the advantages of this
approach).
21. Infra notes 25-31 and accompanying text.
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the dissolution of the marriage.22 The third case illustrates the resolution of a
tort suit between an unmarried couple.23  Finally, a high-profile ongoing
divorce case involving claims of misconduct is discussed.24
In Havell v. Islam,25 the trial court considered the husband's abusive
behavior when it distributed the marital property in the divorce proceeding.26
After almost twenty-one years of marriage, Theresa Havell told her husband,
Aftab Islam, that "she would seek a divorce., 27 A week later, her husband
"pinned [her] to the bed with his knee and began beating her viciously on the
head, face, neck and hands with a barbell," inflicting serious injuries that
required extensive medical treatment including "the surgical installation of a
titanium plate over her eye, over twenty hours of painful dental procedure, and
many other oral and facial surgical procedures. 28  This event was the
culmination of two decades of physical, verbal, and emotional abuse that the
husband inflicted upon his wife and children.29 The trial court concluded: "[A]
pattern of domestic violence.., is a 'just and proper' factor to be considered
by the court in connection with the equitable distribution of marital property."3
Considering the pattern of abuse as well as other factors, the appellate court
affirmed the equitable distribution order awarding the wife 95.5% of the marital
property.31 As this case demonstrates, considering fault within a divorce
proceeding is a way to redress marital wrongs and compensate the injured
party.
In Hakkila v. Hakkila,32 Mrs. Hakkila secured a divorce from her husband
and subsequently instituted a civil tort action for intentional infliction of
22. Infra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
23. Infra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
24. Infra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
25. Havell v. Islam, 751 N.Y.S.2d 449,455 (App. Div. 2002) (affirming the trial court's
"equitable distribution," which limited the defendant-husband to 4.5% of the marital property).
26. See id. at 452 (explaining that the trial court "consider[ed] the issue of marital fault
including the domestic violence" under factor thirteen of equitable distribution, namely "any
other factor which the court shall expressly find to be just and proper").
27. Id. at 450.
28. Id. Following this attack, the husband received a sentence of over eight years in
prison for attempted murder and assault. Id. at 451.
29. See Havell v. Islam, 718 N.Y.S.2d 807, 809-10 (Sup. Ct. 2000) (listing over twenty
incidents of abuse that the wife asserted took place during the marriage).
30. Id. at811.
31. Havell v. Islam, 751 N.Y.S.2d 449,455 (App. Div. 2002).
32. Hakkila v. Hakkila, 812 P.2d 1320, 1327 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991) (dismissing the
plaintiff-wife's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim because it "fail[ed] to meet the
legal standard of outrageousness").
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emotional distress. 33  During the course of their marriage, Mr. Hakkila
committed a number of abusive acts against his wife, including, but not limited
to, slamming part of a camper on her head and hands, using excessive force
during sex, insulting her and screaming obscenities at her in public, and locking
her out of their house in the middle of winter.34 Dismissing her claim, the court
concluded that the husband's conduct did not rise to the level of outrageousness
necessary for recovery. 35 Because New Mexico adopted no-fault divorce, the
court found that the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress had
limited application within the martial context.36 This case raises the possibility
that an aggrieved spouse can recover in a civil suit on the right set of facts,
while recognizing that the marital relationship is unique in civil society.
As a helpful comparison, Curtis v. Firth37 was a personal injury case
between unmarried cohabitants who enjoyed a ten year romantic relationship
with each other.38 Over the course of the relationship, Curtis verbally abused
Firth in public, physically abused her on several occasions, and "forced [Firth]
to engage in sexual acts which she found repugnant and.., sexually assaulted
[her]. 39 In Firth's civil suit for battery and intentional infliction of emotional
distress, the jury awarded her compensatory damages in the amount of
$275,000 in addition to punitive damages totaling $725,000.40 Although the
award in this case is higher than the typical recovery in domestic abuse cases,41
33. Id. at 1321.
34. See id. at 1321-22 (summarizing the incidents of intentional misconduct the husband
inflicted upon his wife during their ten year marriage).
35. See id. at 1327 ("Husband's insults and outbursts fail to meet the legal standard of
outrageousness.... There was no evidence that the other conduct caused severe emotional
distress, as opposed to transient pain or discomfort.").
36. See id. at 1324-26 ("A cautious approach to the tort of intramarital outrage finds
support in the public policy of New Mexico to avoid inquiry into what went wrong in a
marriage.").
37. Curtis v. Firth, 850 P.2d 749, 757 (Idaho 1993) (upholding the jury's verdict against
Curtis on the claims of battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress because of the
abuse he inflicted during the relationship).
38. Id. at 751.
39. Id. at 756-57.
40. Id. at 752. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the finding that Curtis was liable for
the tortious conduct but remanded the case to adequately consider the defendant's claim that the
damage award was excessive. Id. at 762. On remand, the trial court made the requisite findings
and concluded that the damages were not excessive in light of the evidence. Curtis v. Firth, 869
P.2d 229, 230 (Idaho 1994). The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's order. Id.
41. See David E. Poplar, Comment, Tolling the Statute ofLimitationsfor Battered Women
After Giovine v. Giovine: Creating Equitable Exceptions for Victims of Domestic Abuse, 101
DICK. L. REV. 161, 168 (1996) ("Curtis remains one of the largest awards in this type of
action.").
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it demonstrates the potential that civil actions in tort have to provide relief for
parties injured during the course of a close relationship.
A very public divorce marked by political scandal, sexual indiscretion, and
book deals42 demonstrates the continuing prevalence of the divorce-tort hybrid
case. In 2004, while James McGreevey was still the acting governor of New
Jersey, he publicly announced that he was "'a gay American' who had an
extramarital affair with a male aide, and that he would resign" from his political
office.43 In the divorce papers, Dina Matos McGreevey alleged acts of
"extreme cruelty" and requested financial relief for the torts of "fraud,
emotional distress and libel."44 The issues and problems discussed in this Note
will ultimately have to be resolved by the New Jersey court before the
McGreeveys will be able to move on with their lives.
These few cases introduce some of the relevant issues that wronged
spouses must confront during a time of divorce. One principal issue, evoked by
comparing Hakkila to Curtis, is that civil courts are predisposed to apply a
different standard to torts occurring between unmarried couples and married
couples. The Havell and Hakkila decisions demonstrate that, depending on the
circumstances, it may be more advantageous for a spouse to seek a greater share
of the property distribution than to seek compensation in the form of civil
damages.
III. Brief Background of Developments in Divorce Law
Prior to addressing the specific problems posed by the inclusion or
exclusion of tort claims in divorce actions, it is helpful to understand how
divorce law has evolved over the years. The laws governing dissolution have
shifted dramatically from a system concerned with allocating fault to a no-fault
system that avoids assigning blame. In addition to surveying the changes in the
divorce system as a whole, Part 1I discusses the particularly relevant doctrine
of interspousal tort immunity. It is only because the interspousal tort immunity
doctrine has been abolished that commentators are able to debate the merits of
replacing fault considerations in the divorce context with independent tort suits.
42. James McGreevey published a book entitled The Confession while Dina Matos
McGreevey's account appears in her own book entitled Silent Partner: A Memoir of My
Marriage. Jonathan Miller, McGreevey Saga Goes On: Now His Ex-Wife Weighs In, N.Y.
TIMEs, Apr. 1, 2007, § 14 (New Jersey), at 2.
43. The Associated Press, McGreevey Divorce Case: No End to the 'Madness,' N.J.
RECORD, June 17, 2007, at A4.
44. Chris Newmarker, Divorce Case Gets Uglier: Matos McGreevey Cites Extreme
Cruelty in Filing, N.J. REcoRD, May 8, 2007, at A3.
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A. Traditional Fault-Based Divorce
English law did not recognize divorce "until 1857, when divorce
jurisdiction was transferred from the ecclesiastical courts to the civil court
system and divorces were authorized for adultery. ,45 In the United States, the
law regulating civil marriage and divorce varied widely among the colonies.46
Although the laws differed, the colonies recognized divorce or judicial
separation on limited grounds, all involving some degree of fault.47 In addition
to the most common grounds of "[a]dultery, extreme cruelty, and desertion,"
some states included "insanity, conviction of a crime, habitual drunkenness and
drug addiction" to the bases upon which to secure a divorce.48 Until the 1960s,
parties in the United States could not dissolve their marriage unless they could
demonstrate that one spouse engaged in conduct that fell within one of the few
statutory grounds for divorce.49 In sum, courts only granted a divorce when one
party was at fault.
Under this traditional system, the dominant concern was "the strong public
interest in preserving marriage."5°  Providing access to divorce only in
circumstances involving fault furthered the state's interest in protecting the
institution of marriage. Much like the policies underlying tort law, divorce was
45. CLARK, supra note 6, at 407.
46. See NELSON MANFRED BLAKE, THE ROAD TO RENO: A HISTORY OF DIVORCE IN THE
UNITED STATES 34-47 (Greenwood Press 1977) (1962) (surveying the laws of the early colonies
and noting the differences in the various approaches adopted).
47. See id. (discussing the grounds for dissolving a marriage in the original colonies).
The New England colonies-Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and New Hampshire-
all authorized divorce, at least on the grounds of adultery and desertion. Id. at 35-40. The
southern colonies-Virginia, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia-"did not
permit absolute divorce, but [they] did allow judicial separations from bed and board on two
grounds, adultery and cruelty." Id. at 40-41. Finally, the middle colonies-New York, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Delaware-allowed for divorce or separation in cases of adultery or
desertion. Id. at 41-47.
48. JOHN DE WIr GREGORY ET AL., UNDERSTANDING FAMILY LAW 237 (3d ed. 2005).
Adultery involves sexual intercourse outside of the marital relationship and can be proven by
circumstantial evidence "that the [adulterous] spouse had both the disposition and the
opportunity to commit the offense." Id. at 263-64. Cruelty, "the most commonly utilized
ground for divorce in the United States," involves physical or mental harm as well as fear of
physical harm. Id. at 264-65. Desertion is "the breaking off of marital cohabitation with an
intent to end the marriage on the part of the deserting spouse." Id. at 266. Desertion can be
accomplished physically by leaving the domicile, or constructively by withholding sex or
ceasing to perform other marital duties. Id. at 267.
49. See id. at 236-37 (discussing the fault grounds upon which a divorce could be secured
in the United States).
50. Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 Wis. L. REv. 1443, 1471.
472
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"conceived as a remedy for the innocent against the guilty. '51 Accordingly,
when both parties were "guilty... of marital misconduct" the doctrine of
recrimination barred the court from granting a divorce.52 This restrictive
system of divorce eroded in the latter half of the twentieth century as states
granted divorces irrespective of fault.
B. The Emergence of No-Fault Divorce
The limited availability of divorce trapped many couples in dissatisfying
marriages and led to corruption in the family law system.53 Frustration with the
traditional system of divorce emerged from a "view of marriage as an institution
that should last only as long as the emotional needs of the spouses were served
by it.",54 Some unhappy couples resorted to collusion-fabricating evidence of
martial misconduct for the purpose of establishing one of the grounds upon
which a divorce could be granted.55 For example, in one hundred divorce cases
in New York, a Miss Dorothy Jarvis was hired to stage an adulterous
rendezvous at a hotel with the husband where they would be caught in the act
by a photographer-providing the necessary evidence for the wife to secure a
divorce.56
The high incidence of collusion and perjury57 by couples wishing to be
divorced but unable to prove fault led to corruption and challenged the
51. Brown v. Brown, 281 S.W.2d492,498 (Tenn. 1955) (citing Brewiesv. Brewies, 178
S.W.2d 84, 85 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1943)).
52. J.G. Beamer, The Doctrine ofRecrimination in Divorce Proceedings, 10 U. KAN. CITY
L. REv. 213,213 (1941-1942). As Beamer notes: "The paradoxical result is that if both parties
have a ground for divorce, neither party has a right to a divorce." Id.
53. See GREGORY ET AL., supra note 48, at 237 (discussing the downfalls of traditional
divorce law and the catalysts for divorce reform).
54. Barbara Handschu & Mary Kay Kisthardt, Finding Fault: Should 'Legal Punishment'
Be Part of a Divorce Proceeding?, N.Y. FAM. L. MONTHLY, Apr. 2003, at 1, 5; see also Ira
Mark Ellman, Divorce in the United States, in CRoss CURRENTS: FAMILY LAW AND POLICY IN
THE US AND ENGLAND 341,344 (Sanford N. Katz, John Eekelarr, & Mavis Maclean eds., 2000)
(describing the "psychological revolution" in which "[t]he question to consider.., became
whether the parties find the marriage personally fulfilling, not whether their moral commitments
to one another or their children requires its continuation").
55. See Lawrence M. Friedman, A Dead Language: Divorce Law and Practice Before
No-Fault, 86 VA. L. REV. 1497, 1512 (2000) (explaining the concept of collusion and its
widespread use in the practice of divorce law prior to the introduction of no-fault rules).
56. See id. (recounting the story of the infamous blonde who made a career out of"soft-
core adultery").
57. See id. at 1507 (stating that in the early twentieth-century a Massachusetts divorce
court judge "claimed there was 'no tribunal in the country' where 'perjury' was 'more rife than
in the Divorce Court"' (quoting HENRY EDWIN FENN, THuTY-FIvE YEARs IN THE DIVORCE
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legitimacy of the family law system. 58 In response, California enacted the first
"no-fault" law in 1969. 59 This revolutionary legislation inspired similar
changes across the country as the no-fault system grew in popularity. 60 By the
mid-1980s, "all [fifty] states had at least some form of no-fault provision"
integrated into their divorce law6' as either the sole basis for dissolution62 or as
an alternative to the traditional fault-based systems.
63
The typical no-fault divorce cites "irreconcilable differences" or
"irretrievable breakdown" as the basis for dissolution.64 These neutral grounds
for dissolution reduced the "moral stigma" and "scandalous reputation" once
associated with divorce.65 In addition to changing the available grounds for
COURT 139 (1911))).
58. See MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW 191 (1989) ("The
major criticisms leveled at the fault system were that it tended to aggravate and perpetuate
bitterness between the spouses and that the wide-spread practice of using perjured testimony in
collusive divorces promoted disrespect for the legal system."); Ellman, supra note 54, at 341
("The entire package of [fault-based divorce] rules encouraged the very sham that the collusion
doctrine ineffectually sought to suppress.").
59. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 2310 (West 2004) (permitting divorce upon a showing of"the
irremediable breakdown of the marriage" or "incurable insanity"). The 1969 statute read: "A
court may decree a dissolution of the marriage or legal separation on either of the following
grounds, which shall be pleaded generally: (1) [i]rreconcilable differences, which have caused
the irremediable breakdown of marriage[;] (2) [i]ncurable insanity." CAL. Civ. CODE § 4506
(West 1970).
60. See GREGORY ET AL., supra note 48, at 237 (discussing California's reform as the
forefront of the "divorce revolution").
61. Handschu & Kisthardt, supra note 54, at 5; see also GLENDON, supra note 58, at 189
(noting that in 1985, "South Dakota became the last American jurisdiction to repeal an
exclusively fault-based statute").
62. See GREGORY ET AL., supra note 48, at 238 (noting that approximately fifteen states
have adopted a system in which "irreconcilable differences or irretrievable breakdown [is] the
sole ground for divorce").
63. See GLENDON, supra note 58, at 189 (noting that rather than abandon fault all
together, many states "had modernized their law simply by adding nonfault to fault grounds and
eliminating the old traditional defenses of recrimination and collusion"); Peter Nash Swisher,
Reassessing Fault Factors in No-Fault Divorce, 31 FAM. L.Q. 269,297 (1997) ("[A]lmost thirty
years after the so-called no-fault divorce revolution began in America, a majority of American
states still recognize certain enumerated fault grounds as alternative grounds for divorce. .. ");
Jane Biondi, Note, Who Pays for Guilt?: Recent Fault-Based Divorce Reform Proposals,
Cultural Stereotypes and Economic Consequences, 40 B.C. L. REv. 611, 615 (1999)
("[A]lthough fault grounds no longer exist as the exclusive means to dissolve a marriage, they
continue to exist as an alternative divorce procedure in most states.").
64. GREGORY ET AL., supra note 48, at 238; see also Timothy B. Walker, Family Law in
the Fifty States: An Overview, 25 FAM. L.Q. 417, 439-40 (1992) (indicating the bases upon
which a no-fault divorce can be granted in each of the jurisdictions).
65. Michael Grossberg, How to Give the Present a Past? Family Law in the United
States, 1950-2000, in CRoss CURRENTS: FAMILY LAW AND POLICY IN THE US AND ENGLAND,
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dissolution and allowing divorce by mutual consent, the vast majority of no-
fault regimes permit unilateral divorce in which "one spouse [can] terminate a
marriage without the consent of the other.
66
Social scientists studying family relationships suggested that "marriages
broke up in a context of conflicts in attitude, personality, or other difficulty on
both sides, rather than as a result of fault by one spouse and innocence by the
other., 67 Some proponents of the no-fault revolution relied on this social
science evidence to conclude that traditional grounds for divorce-such as
adultery and desertion-were "symptoms" of a failing relationship rather than
the cause of the breakdown.68 While the research supports extending access to
divorce on a no-fault basis, it should not necessarily preclude a court from
considering the harmful "symptoms" when structuring the couple's post-
divorce property settlement.
The emergence of no-fault systems of divorce coincided with the demise
of the perception of the married couple as a single unit and its replacement with
society's recognition that the individual parties in a family are autonomous and
independent.69 This modem perception of the married couple was so widely
accepted that in 1972, the highest court in the country recognized that "the
marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and heart of its own,
but an association of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and
emotional makeup. 70 Consistent with the greater emphasis on the autonomy of
supra note 54, at 3, 7.
66. Id. Only New York, Mississippi, and Tennessee still prohibit unilateral divorce. The
New York no-fault provision requires that "[t]he husband and wife have lived separate and apart
pursuant to a written agreement of separation... for a period of one or more years after the
execution of such agreement. . . ." N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170(6) (McKinney 1999 & Supp.
2009). In Mississippi, a divorce "may be granted on the ground of irreconcilable differences,
but only upon the joint complaint of the husband and wife... ." MiSS. CODE ANN. § 93-5-2(1)
(West 2007 & Supp. 2008). The statute further provides that "no divorce shall be granted on
the ground of irreconcilable differences where there has been a contest or denial ...." Id. § 93-
5-2(5). In order to obtain a no-fault divorce in Tennessee, "the parties [must] have made
adequate and sufficient provision by written agreement for the custody and maintenance of any
children of that marriage and for the equitable settlement of any property rights between the
parties." TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-4-103(b) (2005 & Supp. 2008). The Tennessee law makes
clear that "[i]f there has been a contest or denial of the grounds of irreconcilable differences, no
divorce shall be granted on the grounds of irreconcilable differences." Id. § 36-4-103(e).
67. Grossberg, supra note 65, at 18 (quoting HoMERH. CLARK, JR., CASESAND PROBLEMS
ON DOMESTIC RELATIONS (2d ed. 1974)).
68. Id. at 17-18.
69. See Singer, supra note 50, at 1512 ("The doctrinal shift from family privacy to
decisional autonomy is thus consistent with the rapid shift from fault-based to consensual
divorce and ultimately to divorce at the option of either spouse.").
70. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (discussing the effect that marriage
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the individuals in a relationship, divorce shifted its focus away from assigning
fault and toward restoring the parties' independence through separation.
Securing a divorce became easier under a no-fault system because the
parties no longer had to prove a wrong was committed and either party could
petition for dissolution without the consent of the other spouse. However, the
shift was not entirely advantageous for divorcing couples. Under the fault
system, the wrong of one spouse was often used to affect the property
distribution or the alimony award upon divorce. However, with the de-
emphasis of fault in family law and divorce proceedings, wronged spouses were
no longer compensated for the harm suffered. At approximately the same time
that states began to reform their divorce laws to reflect a scheme of no-fault
divorce, spouses gained the right to sue each other in tort. The emerging
feasibility of interspousal tort suits made the law of torts much more important
as a source of compensation within the context of a failing marriage.
C. The Evolution of Interspousal Torts
The doctrine of interspousal tort immunity evolved primarily from the
notion that a husband and wife were a single legal entity71 and, therefore, could
not have a cause of action against each other.72 It would be logically
inconsistent to allow a man to sue himself for battery because he would be
asserting the claim and defending against it simultaneously. Therefore, a wife
could not sue her husband in tort because they were one person in the eyes of
the law and the suit would be equivalent to a man suing himself.
73
should have on the right of individuals to obtain contraceptives).
71. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *442 ("By marriage, the husband and
wife are one person in law: [That is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is
suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the
husband .... ."). It has been proffered that the concept of marital unity originated in either the
practices of the early Romans or the biblical account of"the creation of woman from [man's]
rib." Jack L. Herskowitz, Comment, Tort Liability Between Husband and Wife: The
Interspousal Immunity Doctrine, 21 U. MIAMI L. REv. 423,425 (1966). For further discussion
regarding the concept of marital unity and its consequences in other areas of the law, see Mark
E. Cammack, Marital Property in California and Indonesia: Community Property and Harta
Bersama, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1417, 1421-22 (2007).
72. See Daniel T. Barker, Note, Interspousal Immunity and Domestic Torts: A New Twist
on the "War of the Roses," 15 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 625, 627-28 (1992) (discussing the
common law "roots of the interspousal tort immunity doctrine").
73. See William E. McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 HARV. L.
REV. 1030, 1033 (1930) ("[T]he duty to make compensation.., would be united eo instante in
the same person, and no cause of action could arise; and even if it could be said to arise, there
would be the procedural difficulty of the husband's being both plaintiff and defendant.").
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The theory that personal tort actions "would disrupt and tend to destroy the
peace and harmony of the home" was often cited as an additional justification
for spousal immunity.74 However, that argument has been criticized as
meritless because "if torts are occurring between a husband and his wife, the
peace and harmony of the family is already gone.0 5  In fact, some
commentators suggest that the availability of a legal remedy may actually
increase marital harmony by "deter[ing] the kind of conduct that produced the
present dispute. 
7 6
The enactment of Married Women's Property Acts during the mid- 1800s
77
recognized the legal identity of women as independent from their husbands,
eroding the marital unity concept.7 At common law, a married woman
relinquished title to her personal property, as well as control over her real
property, to her husband.79 The Married Women's Property Acts altered this
system by extending women the right to own and manage their separate
property during marriage.8°
74. Goode v. Martinis, 361 P.2d 941, 944 (Wash. 1961); see also Thompson v.
Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 617-18 (1910) (suggesting that allowing a wife to maintain an action
against her husband for harms inflicted may be detrimental to "public welfare and domestic
harmony"); Ritter v. Ritter, 31 Pa. 396, 398 (1858) ("The flames which litigation would kindle
on the domestic hearth would consume in an instant the conjugal bond....").
75. Barker, supra note 72, at 628; see also Crowell v. Crowell, 105 S.E. 206, 210 (N.C.
1920) ("Whenever a man has laid open his wife's head with a bludgeon, put out her eye, broken
her arm, or poisoned her body, he is no longer exempt from liability to her on the ground that he
vowed at the altar to 'love, cherish, and protect' her."); CLARK, supra note 6, at 371 (discussing
the absurdity of the marital harmony argument).
76. Note, Litigation Between Husband and Wife, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1650, 1653 (1966).
77. Carl Tobias, Interspousal Tort Immunity in America, 23 GA. L. REv. 359, 371-72
(1989).
78. See GREGORY ET AL., supra note 48, at 72 (describing the Married Women's Property
Acts as "statutes [that] were intended to reduce or eliminate the economic disabilities imposed
on wives under common law").
79. See Cammack, supra note 71, at 1424-25 (describing the property rights of married
women under a common law system).
80. See id. at 1427 (discussing how the Married Women's Property Acts affected the
respective property rights of married individuals). The Virginia statute is representative of the
language used in the Married Women's Property Acts:
A married woman shall have the right to acquire, hold, use, control and dispose of
property as if she were unmarried and such power of use, control and disposition
shall apply to all property of a married woman which has been acquired by her
since April [4, 1877], or shall be hereafter acquired .... [N]either her husband's
right to curtesy nor his marital rights shall entitle him to the possession or use, or to
the rent, issues and profits, of such real estate during the coverture; nor shall the
property of the wife be subject to the debts or liabilities of the husband.
VA. CODE ANN. § 55-35 (1950).
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The statutes also granted a married woman the rights to enter into
contracts and sue independently of her husband.8' Even though a woman could
clearly bring an action against her husband for "matters relating to her separate
property,"8 2 most of the acts did not expressly grant her the right to sue her
husband for tortious conduct.8 3 The failure of the statutes to explicitly address
personal injury suits between spouses made the judiciary reluctant to modify
the common law doctrine of tort immunity.84 However, the increased
independence of married women effectuated by these statutes challenged the
primary rationale for maintaining interspousal tort immunity because the new
laws dismantled the concept of marital unity.85 In 1962, California expressly
abandoned the doctrine of interspousal immunity, allowing the wife to maintain
an action against her husband for assault.8 6 The abrogation of the immunity
81. See GREGORY ET AL., supra note 48, at 72 (describing the various rights women
obtained by virtue of the enactment of the Married Women's Property Acts). Again, the
Virginia statute is illustrative:
A married woman may contract and be contracted with and sue and be sued in the
same manner and with the same consequences as if she were unmarried, whether
the right or liability asserted by or against her shall have accrued heretofore or
hereafter. In an action by a married woman to recover for a personal injury
inflicted on her she may recover the entire damage sustained including the personal
injury and expenses arising out of the injury, whether chargeable to her or her
husband ....
VA. CODE ANN. § 55-36 (1950).
82. Herskowitz, supra note 71, at 424.
83. See id. at 427-30 (discussing the statutes' silence on interspousal tort suits); see also
Tobias, supra note 77, at 373-83 (detailing the three "waves" in which Married Women's
Property Acts were enacted and noting that they were "primarily commercial" in nature without
much if any mention of their effect on the interspousal relationship). For a discussion of the
various approaches taken by states in dealing with a spouse's ability to sue the other spouse in
tort, see William E. McCurdy, Personal Injury Torts Between Spouses, 4 VILL. L. REv. 303,
311-13 (1959).
84. See Tobias, supra note 77, at 383-98 (discussing the approaches taken by judges to
justify retention of the tort immunity in spite of the new statutes).
85. See Self v. Self, 376 P.2d 65, 69 (Cal. 1962) ("[Tlhe fundamental basis of the
interspousal disability doctrine-legal identity of husband and wife-no longer exists.");
Barker, supra note 72, at 629-30 (recognizing the "major trend toward total abrogation of this
antiquated doctrine"). For an expanded discussion on the marital unity doctrine and the
economic, political, and social forces leading to its decline, see Norma Basch, Invisible Women:
The Legal Fiction of Marital Unity in Nineteenth-Century America, in 3 HISTORY OF WOMEN iN
THE UNrrED STATES 132 (Nancy F. Cott ed., 1992).
86. See Self, 376 P.2d at 65, 70 ("[T]he rule should be that one spouse may sue the other
in tort, at least where that tort is an intentional one."). Approximately twenty states had
abolished interspousal immunity prior to California, but Self was an influential case in the
"eventual demise" of the immunity doctrine. Spector, supra note 8, at 745 n.2.
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doctrine became the dominant trend, with only nine jurisdictions retaining some
version of the doctrine into the twenty-first century.87
The "divorce revolution" dramatically transformed the family law
system-allowing parties to decide when divorce was warranted, but at the
same time removing the compensation and punishment functions that fault
served in the traditional system. The elimination of the interspousal tort
immunity doctrine provided injured spouses with an alternative through which
to recover. However, the dichotomy between no-fault divorce and marital tort
actions created an entirely new set of obstacles for aggrieved spouses ranging
from matters of judicial procedure to matters of personal finance.
IV Overview of the No-Fault/Tort Dichotomy
The intersection of the no-fault divorce regime and interspousal torts raises
a number of concerns for the court and the parties involved. Part IV discusses
the American Law Institute's (ALI) recommendation for dealing with tort
claims at the time of divorce, as well as some of the issues that arise when these
two proceedings overlap. The court has to face a number of procedural issues
when parties file for divorce and also institute a tort suit. Particularly, the court
has to wrestle with the applicable statute of limitations, joinder, and res
judicata. Another major issue to consider is the financial position of the
parties.
A. The American Law Institute's Recommendation
According to the American Law Institute, noneconomic fault-such as
adultery, cruelty, or abandonment-is not a legitimate consideration during the
divorce proceeding. Rather, the ALl focuses on dissolving the legal obligations
between the parties and "emphasizes disparities in post-dissolution living
standards as the primary basis for compensatory-payment awards."88 Therefore,
87. See 2 DOMESTIC TORTS: FAMILY VIOLENCE, CONFLICT AND SEXUAL ABUSE app. B, at
683-86 (rev. ed. 2005) (indicating that Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Louisiana, Massachusetts,
Nevada, Utah, and Vermont have not fully abrogated the interspousal tort immunity rule); see
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895F (1979) ("A husband or wife is not immune from
tort liability to the other solely by reason of that relationship."); Wayne F. Foster, Modem Status
of Interspousal Tort Immunity in Personal Injury and Wrongful Death Actions, 92 A.L.R.3d
901 (1979) (surveying changes in the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity and identifying
those jurisdictions that made exceptions to the doctrine or eliminated it all together).
88. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 44 (LexisNexis 2002).
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the divorce proceeding is primarily about distributing the couple's assets and
placing the parties in reasonable financial standing.
The possible "rationale[s] for considering marital misconduct 89 are
punishment of"the spouse who 'caused' the dissolution' 9 or compensation of
the injured party. The ALI rejects punishment as a viable function of divorce
law because of the difficulty in identifying the actual cause of the breakdown in
the relationship and assigning blame accordingly. 9' Furthermore, the ALI
asserts that the criminal law, and to some extent tort law, adequately fulfills the
punishment function, so it is not necessary to unduly complicate the area of
domestic relations with fault considerations.
92
The ALI also criticizes the use of "[f]ault law as a source of
compensation" and argues that tort law fulfills this compensatory function.
93
There are potentially three classes of harm that arise in the context of domestic
misconduct and may be the basis for compensation: (1) financial harm,
(2) emotional harm, and (3) physical harm.94 Financial harm refers to the losses
in available assets at divorce occasioned by purposeful waste or "misconduct
that results in an increase in one spouse's economic needs," such as medical
expenses to treat a physical injury inflicted by the other spouse. 95 All no-fault
regimes uncontroversially recognize financial harm as a relevant consideration
in the division of property and the determination of support awards, such as
alimony.96 The Principles go on to argue that the intentional infliction of
emotional distress tort compensates for emotional harms, while assault and
battery claims compensate for physical harms. 97
The ALI's ultimate conclusion is that any compensatory purpose served by
considering fault within the context of divorce proceedings is already met by
the tort law and "duplication is inadvisable. 9 8 Thus, the ALI perceives divorce
89. Id. at 49.
90. Id at 50.
91. Id.
92. See id. at 49-52 (noting that "[p]unishment is more usually the function of the
criminal law" and that when coupled with punitive damages in tort, "[o]ffensive conduct in
marriage... will normally be actionable whether or not it is the 'cause' of the actor's marital
dissolution").
93. Id. at 52-53 ("[A] fault rule would serve compensation functions that may already be
served by the tort law.").
94. See id. (identifying the potential losses that would be compensated by a fault-based
rule).
95. Handschu & Kisthardt, supra note 54, at 5.
96. AMERiCAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 88, at 52.
97. Id. at 53.
98. Id. The AlI goes on to explain that "[t]here is no reason to reinvent compensation
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as a process to relieve parties of the legal obligations of marriage and
believes other legal mechanisms should remedy the wrongs that took place
during the marital relationship. While such an approach may be
advantageous and desirable in theory, it implicates a number of procedural
problems when put into practice.99
B. Procedural Problems
Widespread reform to eliminate interspousal tort immunity freed spouses
to pursue tort claims on the same basis as unmarried individuals. However,
accompanying this new-found opportunity was an onslaught of procedural
problems regarding how to handle the two claims. The unique procedural
problems that arise in the context of a failing marriage surface because the
parties often bring the tort claim and the divorce action simultaneously or in
close proximity-a factor that is not a consideration for the tort actions of
unmarried litigants. From the ashes of the demise of interspousal tort
immunity arose a phoenix of procedural problems concerning the statute of
limitations, joinder of the claims, and res judicata.
1. Statute of Limitations
Many interspousal tort suits are never litigated "because the statute of
limitations has traditionally posed the greatest obstacle to recovery for
battered spouses who sue their abusers."100 Many civil courts hearing tort
suits conclude that "[e]ach act of abuse gives rise to a claim that is subject to
its own statute of limitations, "'1 which for intentional torts is generally very
principles under the rubric of fault adjudications, nor to incorporate tort principles into divorce
adjudications." Id.
99. The ALl purposefully avoided addressing the procedural problems that accompany a
recommendation to separate divorce and tort suits, focusing instead solely on the substantive
features of tort law. See id. (noting that "consideration of procedural issues [is] beyond the
scope of the[] Principles").
100. Poplar, supra note 41, at 162.
101. de la Croix de Lafayette v. de la Croix de Lafayette, 15 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1501,
1502 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1989); see also Davis v. Bostick, 580 P.2d 544, 547-48 (Or. 1978)
(barring some of plaintiffs older tort claims because "the acts of assault and battery and the
death threat in 1973 and the defamatory abortion talk and death threat in early 1974 were
separately actionable because they caused harm"); Developments in the Law-Legal Responses
to Domestic Violence, 106 HARv. L. REv. 1498, 1532 (1993) [hereinafter Developments in the
Law] (noting that "[c]ourts... have continued to treat each individual occasion of violence as a
separate cause of action subject to its own limitations period").
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short. 0 2 However, victims of marital wrongs are unlikely to institute a civil
action prior to a legal separation or divorce decree. 0 3 The reluctance of an
abused spouse to bring a tort suit while still married stems from a multitude of
concerns including financial dependency on the abusive spouse, concern for
children in the household, and fear of retaliatory violence. 104
The condition of being married generally does not toll the statute of
limitations on a cause of action between spouses.'0 5 Supporters of the ALI's
position argue that the statute of limitations problem is not appropriately
resolved by considering the claim as part of the divorce proceeding because tort
law is better able to address such issues.10 6 In fact, one court suggested that
considering the claim in a dissolution action after the applicable statute of
limitations has expired would be contrary to the policy behind such statutes-to
avoid litigation on old claims. 10 7 Established rules in tort law may in fact be the
best tools for determining the appropriate treatment of the statute of limitations.
However, if they are not applied to allow suits between spouses that were not
previously brought because of the dangers or difficulties in such a course of
action, then, contrary to the ALI's assumption, the victimized spouse cannot
adequately seek relief through tort.
In response to the problems in bringing timely civil actions for marital
torts, some states have altered the tort law to accommodate this unique context.
For instance, California requires that a plaintiff bring an action of assault or
battery within a two year period 10 8 while allowing victims of domestic violence
a three year period from the later of "the date of the last act of domestic
102. See Edward S. Snyder, Remedies for Domestic Violence: A Continuing Challenge, 12
J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 335, 360 (1994) ("Most of the claims pursued by battered
spouses are intentional torts.... which typically carry short limitation periods.").
103. See id. at 361 (recognizing that spouses are less likely to sue each other because of the
heightened emotional and psychological obstacles inherent in attempting to regain "the strength
and courage to escape the [abusive] situation and seek redress").
104. See Stuart v. Stuart, 421 N.W.2d 505, 508 (Wis. 1988) (recognizing that filing a civil
claim against the abusive spouse prior to divorce makes the victim vulnerable to further abuse);
Poplar, supra note 41, at 169-70 (discussing the "societal obstacles" that make it difficult for
abused spouses to file suit).
105. See Barbara H. Young, Interspousal Torts and Divorce: Problems, Policies,
Procedures, 27 J. FAM. L. 489, 491-93 (1989) (noting that the statute of limitations will
continue to run during marriage unless the jurisdiction has specifically suspended it).
106. See Ira Mark Ellman, The Place of Fault in a Modem Divorce Law, 28 ARiz. ST. L.
773, 793 (1996) (arguing that "[t]ort law has a rich body of precedent on these tolling questions
to which it can look in working out a solution").
107. See Davis v. Bostick, 580 P.2d 544, 548 (Or. 1978) ("The policy of the statute of
limitations is to put at legal rest old claims.").
108. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 335.1 (West 2006).
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violence" or "the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have
discovered that an injury or illness resulted from an act of domestic
violence."'1°9 New Jersey made a more dramatic reform by allowing abused
spouses suffering from "battered-woman's syndrome" to treat all acts of
domestic violence occurring during the marriage as a continuing tort, thereby
tolling the statute of limitations.110 The problem posed by the statute of
limitations is tempered in states, such as New Jersey, that have reformed their
laws to account for the marital context. However, in jurisdictions that have not
taken such steps, the ALI's proposal may still leave spouses without a venue in
which to redress past wrongs. Assuming the cause of action is not time-barred,
the court still has to determine how to proceed with the divorce and tort claims.
2. Joinder
The realms of family law and divorce have undergone revolutionary
changes over the past three decades. However, Professor Barbara Glesner
Fines notes:
[A] number of divorces still occur the old fashioned way-with an
extended, adversarial fight over fault and financial distribution. One
question facing the legal system in this climate is the extent to which
divorce should be the last battle-bloody, wide-ranging, but final-or
simply the first step in an ongoing war. An important issue in resolving this
question is the extent to which a spouse may or must join in a divorce
action any tort claims he or she may have against the other spouse.
109. Id. § 340.15(a).
110. See Cusseaux v. Pickett, 652 A.2d 789, 794 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1994)
("Because the battered-woman's syndrome is the result of a continuing pattern of abuse and
violent behavior that causes continuing damage, it must be treated in the same way as a
continuing tort."), overruled on other grounds by Giovine v. Giovine, 663 A.2d 109 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995). The elements of the battered-woman's syndrome cause of action
are:
(1) involvement in a marital or marital-like intimate relationship; and (2) physical
or psychological abuse perpetrated by the dominant partner to the relationship over
an extended period of time; and (3) the aforestated abuse has caused recurring
physical or psychological injury over the course of the relationship; and (4) a past
or present inability to take any action to improve or alter the situation unilaterally.
Id. at 793-94. A wife attempting to sue on the basis of battered woman's syndrome must
provide "expert testimony establishing that the wife was caused to have an 'inability to take any
action to improve or alter the situation unilaterally."' Giovine v. Giovine, 663 A.2d 109, 114
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995) (quoting Cusseaux, 652 A.2d at 794), overruled on other
grounds by Brennan v. Orban, 678 A.2d 667 (N.J. 1996).
111. Barbara Glesner Fines, Joinder of Tort Claims in Divorce Actions, 12 J. AM. AcAD.
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The rules of joinder, referred to by Professor Fines, govern "[t]he
uniting of parties or claims in a single lawsuit."'"12 One matter that affects
the issue of joinder is subject matter jurisdiction. Subject matter
jurisdiction refers to a court's ability to hear a particular type of case and to
award a particular remedy."13 Every state has a court of general jurisdiction
with the ability to hear a broad range of cases, 1 4 but there are also a
number of courts of limited jurisdiction-such as juvenile courts, which
only hear cases involving minors.' 15 In some states, divorce actions are
heard by courts of general jurisdiction," 6 but there are also a number of
states that utilize specialized family law courts to handle divorces."
17
Courts can also be divided into chancery courts, which apply principles of
equity, and courts of law. 118 Divorce is considered an equitable proceeding
while tort suits are actions in law, potentially creating jurisdictional
problems in those states that maintain a distinction between law and
equity.' 19
The states that have addressed these procedural incompatibilities have
adopted drastically different approaches to the possibility of joinder.
120
MATRIM. LAW 285, 285 (1994).
112. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 853 (8th ed. 2004).
113. Id.at870.
114. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-10-101 (1994) ("The circuit court is a court of
general jurisdiction, and the judge thereof shall administer right and justice according to law, in
all cases where the jurisdiction is not conferred upon another tribunal.").
115. See, e.g., id § 37-1-103 (providingjuvenile courts with exclusive original jurisdiction
over matters involving juvenile delinquency, child neglect, and guardianship).
116. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-96 (2004 & Supp. 2007) (establishing that divorce actions
fall within the general jurisdiction of the circuit court).
117. See Aither v. Estate of Aither, 913 A.2d 376, 377-78 (Vt. 2006) (noting that the
family court is a court of "limited jurisdiction" with the ability to adjudicate "seventeen types of
proceedings, including divorces"). For charts detailing the use of family law courts and the
subject matter jurisdiction of those courts in each of the states, see Linda D. Elrod & Robert G.
Spector, A Review of the Year in Family Law: State Courts React to Troxel, 35 FAM. L.Q. 577,
628-33 (2002).
118. See Morton Gitelman, The Separation of Law and Equity and the Arkansas Chancery
Courts: Historical Anomalies and Political Realities, 17 U. ARK. LITrLE ROCK L.J. 215,223-
25 (1995) (discussing the historical separation of matters in equity from those in law and the
jurisdiction exercised by the Chancery Court). For additional discussion of the creation of the
Chancery Court in England and the evolution of the distinction between law and equity, see
DOUG RENDLEMAN, REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 9-14 (7th ed. 2006).
119. See Young, supra note 105, at 493-99 (noting the subject matter differences between
the two actions).
120. See Fines, supra note I l, at 285-87 (discussing various approaches to joining tort
and divorce proceedings).
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Nine states-Arizona,' 21 Colorado,122 Iowa,1 23 Massachusetts, 24 New
Hampshire, 125 Ohio, 126 Utah,127 Vermont, 128 and Wyoming129-prohibit joinder
of tort and divorce actions. Some courts have focused on the inconsistency
between tort actions and no-fault divorce, concluding that allowing joinder of
the actions would be contrary to the "legislative intent."' 30 Another rationale
for prohibiting joinder is the different objectives of the actions. The purpose of
a divorce is to separate the parties while the "purpose of the tort suit is to
provide damages to the injured spouse." 131 Finally, courts prohibiting joinder
cite the nature of the claims as justification for keeping the actions separate'
32
because joining equitable claims with legal claims may deprive the parties of
their constitutional right to a jury trial.133 Generally, a plaintiff in a tort action
121. See Windauer v. O'Connor, 485 P.2d 1157, 1158 (Ariz. 1971) ("[T]he peculiar and
special nature of a divorce action speaks against the brining of the two actions in one
litigation.").
122. See Simmons v. Simmons, 773 P.2d 602,605 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988) (concluding "that
sound policy considerations preclude either permissive or compulsory joinder of interspousal
tort claims, or non-related contract claims, with dissolution of marriage proceedings").
123. See IOWA CODE § 598.3 (2001) ("An action for dissolution of marriage shall be by
equitable proceedings, and no cause of action, save for alimony, shall be joined therewith.").
124. SeeHeacockv. Heacock,520N.E.2d 151, 153 (Mass. 1988)("Theplaintiffcouldnot
have recovered damages for the tort in the divorce action, as the Probate Court does not have
jurisdiction to hear tort actions and award damages.").
125. See Aubert v. Aubert, 529 A.2d 909, 912 (N.H. 1987) ("The issue of his right to
recover damages for his injuries was not before the divorce court, and could not have been.
Indeed, the divorce court would be without jurisdiction to award damages for personal
injuries.").
126. See Koepke v. Koepke, 556 N.E.2d 1198, 1199 (Ohio App. 1989) (concluding that a
"cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress should have been considered
separately from the divorce proceeding").
127. See Walther v. Walther, 709 P.2d 387, 388 (Utah 1985) ("[D]ivorce actions will
become unduly complicated in their trial and disposition if torts can be or must be litigated in
the same action." (quoting Lord v. Shaw, 665 P.2d 1288, 1291 (Utah 1983))).
128. See Ward v. Ward, 583 A.2d 577, 581 (Vt. 1990) (ruling that the spouses' tort claims
"were improperly joined into the divorce action").
129. See McCulloh v. Drake, 24 P.3d 1162, 1171 (Wyo. 2001) ("[O]ur holding precludes
tort issues from being joined with marital dissolution issues .... ").
130. Fines, supra note 111, at 304.
131. Kristyn J. Krohse, Note, No Longer Following the Rule of Thumb-What to Do With
Domestic Torts and Divorce Claims, 1997 U. ILL. L. REv. 923, 937.
132. See Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369, 1371 (Utah 1988) ("Tort claims, which are legal
in nature, should be kept separate from divorce actions, which are equitable in nature.").
133. See Young, supra note 105, at 498 (explaining "that joinder may interfere with the
right to a jury trial for the tort").
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seeking damages has a constitutional right to a trial by jury;134 however, in most
states there is no right to a jury trial in a divorce action.
135
New Jersey takes the opposite approach and requires that all claims arising
from the marriage be joined in a single suit.136 The McGreevey case, which is
pending in New Jersey, 131 will be joined consistent with this rule. One
rationale for requiring joinder is that a marriage is a single transaction and the
doctrine of res judicata would bar a separate action. 38 Another reason to join
the actions is a concern for "fairness to the tortfeasor spouse" because a
separate tort action "allow[s] an unjust redistribution of marital resources based
on only one factor (tortious conduct), rather than the equitable, multi-factored
distribution that occurs in dissolution proceedings."'
139
At least eleven states take an intermediate position, encouraging or
permitting tort claims to be joined with divorce actions, but not requiring
joinder. 40 As noted by Professor Fines, the advantage of this approach is that it
is flexible enough to accommodate the needs and desires of the parties:
This approach responds to the needs of the litigants in the vast majority of
tort cases who, as abused spouses, may be emotionally unable or unwilling
to bring tort actions during the tumultuous and dangerous time of divorce.
134. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. VII ("In [s]uits at common law, where the value in
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved .... "); TEX.
CONST. art. I, § 15 ("The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate.").
135. See, e.g., Hutchings v. Hutchings, No. 054449S, 1993 WL 57741, at *9 (Conn. Super.
Feb. 22, 1993) ("The reason[] that divorce practice takes place before judges, not juries is
because distributing a marital estate often requires complex accounting of the parties' mutual
claims against each other."). But see N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 173 (McKinney 1999) ("In an
action for divorce there is a right to trial by jury of the issues of the grounds for granting the
divorce.").
136. Brown v. Brown, 506 A.2d 29, 33-35 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986) (reaffirming
joinder for marital tort claims arising before the divorce proceeding commences but holding that
the issue ofjoinder should be left to the judge's discretion when the tortious conduct occurs
after the divorce action has been instituted).
137. Supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
138. See Tevis v. Tevis, 400 A.2d 1189, 1196 (N.J. 1979) (requiring the joinder of
interspousal tort claims and divorce proceedings "under the 'single controversy' doctrine").
139. Fines, supra note 111, at 292.
140. For middle-ground states' cases, see generally Jackson v. Hall, 460 So. 2d 1290 (Ala.
1984); Nelson v. Jones, 787 P.2d 1031 (Alaska 1990); Hutchings v. Hutchings, No. 054449S,
1993 WL 57741 (Conn. Super. Feb. 22, 1993); Mize v. Mize, 56 S.E.2d 121 (Ga. Ct. App.
1949); Nash v. Overholser, 757 P.2d 118 (Idaho 1988); McNevin v. McNevin, 447 N.E.2d 611
(Ind. Ct. App. 1983); Pelletier v. Pelletier, 742 P.2d 1027 (Nev. 1987); Maharam v. Maharam,
575 N.Y.S.2d 846 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991); Kemp v. Kemp, 723 S.W.2d 138 (Tenn. 1987);
Mogford v. Mogford, 616 S.W.2d 936 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981); and Stuart v. Stuart, 421 N.W.2d
505 (Wis. App. 1988).
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For those litigants who do wish to resolve all issues at once, however, this
approach allows for that efficiency.1
41
Some couples value "a quick, efficient, less costly resolution" while others are
willing to endure the time and expense of a separate proceeding. 142 Although
the procedural problems affecting joinder-such as whether ajury trial will be
permitted-persist in these jurisdictions, the aggrieved party is "able to weigh
the factors and decide what is most important."1
43
Parties who adopt the ALI's approach and commence separate tort actions
at the time of divorce have to determine when and where they can bring the
claim. In some states, the claims fall within the jurisdiction of different courts.
The states disagree on the most appropriate resolution; some states adopt
completely opposing views ofjoinder and other states hedge their bets with an
intermediate approach. Where the two claims are not joined for litigation, the
parties must confront the danger that the tort claim will be barred by the
doctrine of res judicata.
3. Res Judicata
The doctrine of res judicata "prevents a party from suing on a claim which
has been previously litigated to a final judgment by that party or such party's
privies and precludes the assertion by such parties of any legal theory, cause of
action, or defense which could have been asserted in that action.' 44 In effect,
the doctrine of res judicata serves as a form of protection from the civil
equivalent of double jeopardy because it only allows one suit over the same
problem. 145 Entry of a final property settlement in a divorce proceeding often
"provides a full, final, and complete compromise of all matters" and may
preclude the wronged spouse from pursuing a tort claim for conduct occurring
in the marriage. 146 This result is even more likely where one party has
introduced evidence of wrongdoing in an attempt "to receive a disproportionate
141. Fines, supra note 111, at 286-87.
142. Krohse, supra note 13 1, at 957.
143. Id.
144. 18 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 131.10(1)(a) (3d ed.
2008).
145. See Krohse, supra note 13 1, at 937 ("The judicial system enforces res judicata in
order to avoid relitigation, conserve judicial resources, and provide the prevailing party with
stability ofjudgment.").
146. Young, supra note 105, at 501-02 (citing Jackson v. Hall, 460 So. 2d 1290 (Ala.
1984)).
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share of community property" because the issue has been directly considered by
the court. 1
47
There are two major tests used to determine if the doctrine ofresjudicata
precludes a subsequent action: the "transactional test" and the "same claim
test." 148  According to the transactional test, a final judgment
"extinguishe[s] ... all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant
with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected
transactions, out of which the action arose. 1 49 This approach focuses on the
real-world factual settings in which claims arise rather than the legal theories
brought before the court. 50 For example, a car accident is a single factual
event and under the transactional test, a final judgment for damage to the car
would preclude a second suit for personal injuries.' 5' Similarly, a marriage can
be viewed as a single transaction or as a series of transactions such that all
claims arising from the marital relationship would have to be resolved in a
single proceeding.
The same claim test is somewhat narrower than the transactional test and
only precludes actions "that involve the same primary rights."152 In contrast to
the transactional approach, the same claim test focuses on the substantive
theory of recovery that occasioned the suit. 153 For example, a party involved in
a car accident could legitimately bring separate actions for the damage to the
car and for the personal injuries on the basis that "the right to be free of bodily
147. Brinkman v. Brinkman, 966 S.W.2d 780, 783 (Tex. App. 1998); see also Coleman v.
Coleman, 566 So. 2d 482, 485-86 (Ala. 1990) (concluding that the final divorce settlement
barred the wife's claim for tortious transmission of a sexually transmitted disease where
evidence of the disease was introduced during the divorce proceeding). The Brinkman court
discussed the rationale for precluding a tort suit, noting that:
To hold otherwise would enable a spouse to use one instance of abuse as grounds
for receiving a large amount of temporary spousal support or a greater share of
community property, and then another instance of abuse to obtain actual and
punitive damages from the former spouse .... The prevention of such a situation is
one purpose of res j udicata.
Brinkman, 966 S.W.2d at 783.
148. Fines, supra note 111, at 291-92.
149. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24(1) (1982).
150. See id. at § 24 cmt. a ("The present trend is to see a claim in factual terms and to make
it coterminous with the transaction regardless of the number of substantive theories, or variant
forms of relief flowing from those theories, that may be available to the plaintiff.").
151. Id. at § 24 cmt. c, illus. 1.
152. Fines, supra note 111, at 292.
153. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 cmt. a (1982) ("[D]efeated in an
action based on one theory, the plaintiff might be able to maintain another action based on a
different theory, even though both actions were grounded upon the defendant's identical act or
connected acts forming a single life-situation.").
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injury [is] distinct from the property right." 154 In the context of the same claim
test, an injured spouse may argue that the divorce proceeding is meant "to sever
the marital relationship between the parties" and is, therefore, distinct and
independent from the right to recover damages in tort for physical or mental
harm.
155
Regardless of which of the two tests is used, courts are inclined to
"liberally construe the causes of action so as to avoid the problem of res
judicata barring a later-filed tort claim" if possible. 156 However, the court may
bar the tort claim where relevant evidence of misconduct is introduced in the
dissolution action, even if the court does not issue an ultimate ruling on the
claim. 57  Parties that enter into a settlement agreement in the divorce
proceeding and avoid formally litigating their claims have to be careful that
they do not waive the right to bring a subsequent tort action.' 
58
C. The Problem of the Lesser-Earning Tortfeasor
When discussing the role of fault in divorce and the financial
consequences to the parties, there is a tendency to assume that the economically
superior spouse-stereotypically the husband-is the wrongdoer.159 Flowing
from this assumption, some scholars argue that the consideration of fault
provides the abused spouse with leverage to achieve "better financial
settlements" upon divorce. 16 According to this view, the aggrieved spouse can
use the threat of a public trial to negotiate a more favorable economic
arrangement, and if the matter does go to trial the injured spouse can use the
evidence of fault to "receive a greater economic share of the property and
significant spousal support by the court. ' ' 16 1 Advocates of no-fault divorce
154. Id.
155. Heacock v. Heacock, 520 N.E.2d 151, 153 (Mass. 1988); see also Henriksen v.
Cameron, 622 A.2d 1135, 1141 (Me. 1993) ("An action for divorce, even based on the [fault]
ground... is not based on the same underlying claim as an action in tort .....
156. Krohse, supra note 131, at 937-38.
157. See Young, supra note 105, at 501 (discussing the pitfalls that litigants may fall victim
to in litigating a divorce action).
158. See Gramer v. Gramer, 523 N.W.2d 861, 862-63 (Mich. App. 1994) ("A property
agreement that purports to settle all claims arising from the marriage and divorce bars future or
existing tort claims brought by one spouse against another.").
159. See Jana Singer, Divorce Reform and Gender Justice, 67 N.C. L. REv. 1103, 1110
(1989) (challenging the "unsupported assumption that women were generally the 'innocent'
spouses").
160. Biondi, supra note 63, at 620.
161. Id. at621.
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claim that the wronged spouse can attain the same leverage for economic gain
through the threat of a separate tort suit.
162
What neither of these positions adequately considers is the fact that the
tortfeasor is not always the primary income earner in the relationship. Lower-
and middle-class couples are particularly devastated by divorce because they
rarely have the marital assets necessary to allow both parties to live apart
comfortably. 163 Under a no-fault system of divorce, with its emphasis on equal
or equitable distribution of property, the spouse who does not have a substantial
source of independent income is in danger of becoming impoverished by a
subsequent tort action.164
Exacerbating the problem further is the fact that the lesser-earning
tortfeasor may become judgment-proof in tort. It has already been established
that the parties are going to take a financial hit after divorce and only in the rare
case are both parties going to be able to maintain the same standard of living
that was enjoyed during the marriage.165 An added obstacle is that the
tortfeasor may squander his or her portion of the marital property, or creditors
may make claims against those funds before a tort suit can be resolved and a
damage award issued.166 As a result, reliance on a separate tort action may
force the injured spouse to relinquish property or funds that would otherwise be
retained in a dissolution proceeding.
Tort law is concerned with compensation and not relative equity.
Therefore, a damages award in tort, if recoverable, may leave the guilty party in
162. See id. at 630 (arguing that "tort actions seem to serve a leveraging function similar to
fault in the fault regime"); Ellman, supra note 106, at 792 (arguing against the incorporation of
tort claims into the divorce proceeding because "some tort claims might be made for tactical
advantage in the divorce settlement negotiations").
163. See Cynthia Starnes, Divorce and the Displaced Homemaker: A Discourse on
Playing With Dolls, Partnership Buyouts and Dissociation Under No-Fault, 60 U. CHI. L. REV.
67, 85-95 (1993) (criticizing no-fault principles of property division for inadequately
accounting for the economic realities faced by many divorcing couples).
164. See id. at 78-85 (discussing the economic hardship experienced by homemakers after
divorce).
165. See Sanford L. Braver, Jessica R. Shapiro, & Matthew R. Goodman, Consequences of
Divorce for Parents, in HANDBOOK OF DIVORCE AND RELATIONSHIP DISSOLUTION 313, 318
(Mark A. Fine & John H. Harvey eds., 2005) (recognizing the inevitable reduction in resources
available to divorced spouses). A number of studies indicate that females fair much worse after
a divorce than their male counterparts. See, e.g., Karen C. Holden & Pamela J. Smock, The
Economic Costs of Marital Dissolution: Why Do Women Bear a Disproportionate Cost?, 17
ANN. REV. Soc. 51, 53 (1991) ("[G]ender differentials are marked, with men generally better off
following separation and divorce, relative both to women and to their pre-disruption standard of
living.").
166. See Spector, supra note 8, at 762 ("[E]ven when the client is willing to bring a
separate tort action there may not be a source of funds to pay the damages.").
WRONGS COMMITTED DURING A MARRIAGE
poverty. An equitable distribution of property that considers fault can more
adequately balance the compensatory purpose with the desire to leave both
parties above subsistence levels when feasible.
The ALI's proposal to eliminate noneconomic fault from the divorce
proceeding and to require injured spouses to bring a separate tort action forces
the courts to resolve a number of complex procedural problems. An aggrieved
spouse first has to hurdle the statute of limitations and the doctrine of res
judicata before the possibility of suing in tort becomes an option. Additionally,
when the plaintiff is the wealthier spouse the ability to recover in tort may be
effectively barred because of the inability to "get blood from a turnip." Even if
the injured spouse overcomes these substantial obstacles, it is meaningless if
the substantive law of torts fails to provide an adequate remedy-a matter
discussed in Part V.
V. Are Tort Suits an Adequate Alternative?
In support of its position that fault is an inappropriate consideration in a
divorce proceeding, the American Law Institute claims that wronged spouses
can turn to criminal law or tort law to seek compensation for any perceived
wrongs.167 However, surveying the case law and recognizing the realities of
litigation calls the ALI's assumption into question. Tort actions between
spouses may generally prove more difficult than those between strangers
because a different standard applies within the marriage on the theory that
"husbands and wives 'assume the risk' of minor assaults or of negligence in the
conduct of the home." 168 Part V discusses various torts that divorcing spouses
167. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 88, at 52-53.
168. Note, supra note 76, at 1661; see also Comment, Tort Liability Within the Family
Area-A Suggested Approach, 51 Nw. U. L. REv. 610,618 (1956) (suggesting that because of
the "constant contact" between family members "it seems unjust and unwise to decide arbitrarily
that members of the family must observe the same standards of conduct toward one another that
they are required to observe toward other persons"). An example of the application of a
different standard and the notion of assuming the risk or consent appeared in the criminal law's
marital exemption for rape. The common law definition of rape was "the unlawful carnal
knowledge of a woman, not a spouse, forcibly and against her will." 1 DoMEsrIc TORTS:
FAMmY VIOLENCE, CONFLICT AND SEXUAL ABUSE § 1:28, at 97 (rev. ed. 2005). Therefore, by
marriage, a woman gave "irrevocable implied consent" to engage in sexual relations with her
husband and the husband was immune from prosecution for rape. Id. However, by the mid-
1980s the tides had turned and a majority of jurisdictions abolished marriage as a defense to a
rape charge. See id. at 97-98 (discussing the ways in which states have limited or abolished the
exemption and noting that even where a criminal charge is barred, "one should always consider
a civil action for assault and battery").
66 WASH. &LEE L. REV. 465 (2009)
often invoke and explores whether tort suits actually compensate wronged
spouses.
A. Assault and Battery
Prior to the 1970s, domestic violence victims could not sue in tort for
damages but could only seek an injunction in connection with a divorce or legal
separation. 69 After the abolition of interspousal tort immunity, victims of
abuse have successfully sued for both compensatory and punitive damages. 1
70
In fact, claims of assault and battery account for the "vast majority of
interspousal torts.0
7 1
To succeed on a claim for battery, a plaintiff must show (1) "a harmful or
offensive contact with [a] person"; (2) resulting from an "act[] intend[ed] to
cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person... or an imminent
apprehension of such a contact."1 72 To succeed on a claim for assault, the
plaintiff must prove "an imminent apprehension of [a harmful or offensive]
contact" and that the defendant "intend[ed] to cause a harmful or offensive
contact.., or an imminent apprehension of such a contact. ', 73 Divorcing
spouses do not face any special barriers to succeeding on assault or battery
claims because the applicable standards and elements are very objective. For
example, a woman recovered $30,000 in compensatory and punitive damages
after her husband "dragged her down a stairway by her feet because he thought
it was 'comical.' ' 74 Tort suits for assault and battery seem to be adequate to
compensate spouses for physical harms incurred during the marriage.
However, because not all torts are created equal it is important to investigate
the adequacy of other torts before concluding that the ALI's recommendation
should be adopted.
169. See Developments in the Law, supra note 101, at 1528 (discussing the difficulty of
getting relief for domestic abuse).
170. See id. at 1531 (discussing tort actions as one of the state responses to the problem of
domestic violence).
171. Fines, supranote 111, at297.
172. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 (1965). Although the Restatement Third is in
the publication process, the drafters expressly stated that "the Restatement Second remains
largely authoritative in explaining the details of the specific torts encompassed by this Section"
on intentional physical harms. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 5, cmt. c. (Proposed Final
Draft No. 1, 2005).
173. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 21 (1965).
174. Catlett v. Catlett, 388 S.E.2d 14, 15 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989).
WRONGS COMMTTED DURING A MARRIAGE
B. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Behind claims of assault and battery, "[i]ntentional infliction of emotional
distress is the second most commonly alleged tort in divorce actions."' 75 To
succeed on a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (HED), a
plaintiff must show that the defendant: (1) "intentionally or recklessly"
(2) "cause[d] severe emotional disturbance" (3) "by extreme and outrageous
conduct.'0 7 6  Generally, the element that makes or breaks an intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim is the "extreme and outrageous conduct"
element.177 This is particularly the case in the context of a marriage, where the
parties are not allowed to recover for the "subtle ebb and flow of married
life.' 78 Moreover, "most marriages ending in divorce see their share of insults,
indignities, threats, annoyances and petty oppressions as well as transient and
trivial mental anguish" but do not give rise to civil liability.7
Unlike the elements for assault or battery, the outrage element of an IIED
case is a very subjective standard. The application of this special rule for
spouses leads to inconsistent application of the outrageous element. In
Henriksen v. Cameron,180 the court upheld a jury award of "$75,000 in
compensatory damages and $40,000 in punitive damages" in an intentional
175. Barker, supra note 72, at 626.
176. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 45 (Tentative Draft No. 5, 2007). For a discussion
of the initial resistance to recognizing the infliction of mental injury as a basis for liability and
the eventual emergence of the independent tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, see
WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 12, at 49-56 (4th ed. 1971) and
Daniel Givelber, The Right to Minimum Social Decency and the Limits of Evenhandedness:
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by Outrageous Conduct, 82 COLUM. L REv. 42,43-
45 (1982).
177. See Bradley A. Case, Note, Turning Marital Misery into Financial Fortune:
Assertion of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claims by Divorcing Spouses, 33 U.
LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 101, 107 (1994) ("In or out of the marital context, most litigation of
intentional infliction of emotional distress claims centers around the definition of 'outrageous'
conduct."); Ellman, supra note 106, at 795 ("[I]n practice the action boils down to the one
element of 'outrage."').
178. 1 DOMESTIC TORTS: FAMILY VIOLENCE, CONFLICTAND SEXuALABuSE § 1:34 (rev. ed.
2005). Additionally, "recovering for 'purely' emotional harm (as opposed to emotional harm
accompanied by physical injury) seems virtually impossible because almost every dissolving
marriage is extremely distressful." Case, supra note 177, at 102; see also Koepke v. Koepke,
556 N.E.2d 1198, 1200 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989) (finding that because "almost all divorce actions
involve some form of emotional distress," the plaintiff must show that serious harm was
inflicted).
179. Case, supra note 177, at 115.
180. Henriksen v. Cameron, 622 A.2d 1135, 1137 (Me. 1993) (holding that the ex-wife's
intentional infliction of emotion distress claim was actionable and affirming the trial court's
judgment).
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infliction of emotional distress action based on the physical and verbal abuse
inflicted by the husband on the wife during their twelve year marriage.' 81 On
the other hand, in Hakkila--discussed in Part 11-the court found that public
verbal abuse, failure to engage in normal sexual relations, and multiple
instances of battery over the course of a ten year marriage were not sufficiently
outrageous to recover on a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. 182 There is no readily ascertainable difference between the two cases
and yet one wife was awarded over $100,000 while the other walked away
empty-handed. Such divergent results suggest that tort law may not be
effectively redressing the emotional harm between married persons.
C. Adultery
Despite the fact that adultery is a common source of harm arising in a
marriage, such conduct has been virtually eradicated as a basis for a claim to
recover damages in any area of the law. Surprisingly, in approximately 40% of
states, adultery is not even an available ground for securing a divorce.
83
Adultery is a crime in half of the states, punishable by a monetary penalty in
some states and up to five years in prison in others.' 84 However, these laws
have never been substantially enforced.1 85 Extramarital sex was also the basis
for civil liability under the torts of "alienation of affections" and "criminal
conversation."'18 6 Both torts allowed the faithful spouse to recover damages
from the third party who participated in the affair, but not from the adulterous
181. Id. at 1137-38, 1144.
182. See Hakkila v. Hakkila, 812 P.2d 1320, 1321-22, 1327 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991)
(dismissing the wife's claim for "fail[ure] to meet the legal standard of outrageousness").
183. See GREGORY ETAL.,supra note 48, at 263 (noting that adultery "is currently a ground
for divorce in approximately [twenty-nine] states").
184. See Martin J. Siegel, For Better or for Worse: Adultery, Crime & the Constitution, 30
J. FAM. L. 45, 49-52 (1991-1992) (discussing the criminalization of adultery in the twentieth
century).
185. Id. at 52-53.
186. See Jill Jones, Comment, Fanning an Old Flame: Alienation of Affections and
Criminal Conversation Revisited, 26 PEPP. L. REv. 61, 66-67 (1999) (discussing the origins of
tort liability for adultery). To succeed in a suit for "alienation of affections, the plaintiff must
first prove that true affection existed in the marriage at one time; second, it must be shown that
the affection is now destroyed; and third, that the defendant caused that destruction, or at least
impairment, of the marital relationships." Id. at 68. An action for "[c]riminal conversation
requires proof of adulterous relations between the plaintiff's spouse and the defendant, as well
as proof of a valid marriage between the plaintiff and the allegedly errant spouse." Id. at 67.
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spouse. 187 Today, states have either abolished these causes of action "or have
simply not recognized them in recent years."'
l88
The most plausible modem theory of recovery for an extramarital affair in
tort is through an action for infliction of emotional distress.'89 Although
adultery causes a great deal of emotional turmoil in a marriage, "[c]ourts have
generally agreed that while adulterous conduct of a spouse is not acceptable, it
does not rise to the level of outrageousness required in an intentional infliction
of emotional distress case."' 190 This seemingly harsh result is predicated on the
notion that individuals in a marriage continue to enjoy personal autonomy and
sexual liberty.191 Adultery is clearly an instance of marital misconduct that
causes harm, yet tort law fails to provide the faithful spouse with a remedy.
D. Realities of Civil Litigation
The ALI's assertion that spouses can seek redress for marital wrongs
through a tort suit assumes that such an avenue is actually feasible for the
parties. Bringing a civil suit is an expensive endeavor and, because of crowded
court dockets, relief can take years. 92 The expense and sacrifice associated
with litigation is particularly pronounced when the parties have recently
resolved one suit-the divorce proceeding. 93 Participating in litigation is
187. See id. at 67-69 (reviewing the elements of the torts and the nature of the damages
awarded).
188. Id. at 70 n.80.
189. Supra Part V.B.
190. Spector, supra note 8, at 750; see also Whittington v. Whittington, 766 S.W.2d 73,
74-75 (Ky. App. 1989) ("The emotional and financial distress caused by a spouse's fraud and
adultery may be very painful and difficult but does not necessarily implicate the tort of
outrage."); Quinn v. Walsh, 732 N.E.2d 330, 334 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000) (ruling that "an
adulterous affair that was openly conducted and initiated 'in part' to injure a plaintiff' was
insufficient to state a claim upon which relief may be granted); Ruprecht v. Ruprecht, 599 A.2d
604, 608 (N.J. Super. Ch. 1991) (concluding that the wife's eleven year affair "fail[ed] to reach
the level of outrageousness necessary for liability under this tort").
191. See Hakkilav. Hakkila, 812 P.2d 1320, 1324 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991) ("[T]he interest in
personal autonomy apparently has led courts to reject a cause of action when a person
intentionally causes emotional distress by engaging in an extramarital relationship ...");
Givelber, supra note 176, at 57 (noting that the "concern for personal liberty... includes the
freedom to exercise privacy rights even in the face of certain knowledge that it will severely
distress another").
192. See Developments in the Law, supra note 101, at 1532-33 (recognizing the practical
limitations of tort suits to remedy situations of marital abuse).
193. See Swisher, supra note 63, at 316 ("[S]eparate marital tort claims would foster a
costly, onerous, and largely unnecessary multiplicity of lawsuits, especially for injured spouses
of modest means .... ).
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generally exhausting for the parties, win or lose. The experience is particularly
emotionally and psychologically draining when it involves the dissolution of a
relationship---the parties usually want a sense of closure and are reluctant to re-
open wounds that have begun to heal. 194
The financial toll that litigation and divorce take on parties is a major
barrier to filing a second suit. Separate suits necessitate separate court fees,
attorney fees, and various other expenses associated with litigating a tort claim.
While these costs are burdensome for any litigant, a majority of recently
divorced persons are in a particularly dire situation. 95 As a practical matter,
the standard of living for both individuals in a newly divorced couple takes a
major hit because they now have to incur more in basic living expenses. 196 A
Connecticut court recognized that the culmination of the two events can be
particularly burdensome:
Divorce is generally a zero sum economic transaction: [T]here is not
enough money in the marital settlement pot for both spouses to live
postdivorce at the same standard of living as before the divorce. Increasing
the transaction costs of the divorce settlement by reopening proceedings
reduces further the total resources available for the postdivorce family to
live on. 1
97
Case law demonstrates that with the exception of claims for assault and
battery, a civil suit in tort is not a realistic option for divorcing spouses.
Married persons have to confront heightened standards to recover for emotional
distress and they are left without any course of action against an adulterous
spouse. Furthermore, even if the currently available torts were adequate to
compensate injured spouses, the personal and financial burdens of commencing
a civil suit while securing a divorce can effectively deter the pursuit of valid
claims. The inadequacy of tort law to provide aggrieved spouses with
appropriate relief necessitates the development of other alternatives.
194. See Spector, supra note 8, at 762 ("[P]ractically all clients show a distaste for the
prolonging of the process that a civil case would entail. As a result, a large number of cases that
otherwise might prove to be viable are simply not filed.").
195. See Braver et al., supra note 165, at 318 (discussing the financial burdens of divorce
and estimating that the average divorce costs $20,000).
196. See id. ("[B]ecause of economies of scale, two households are more expensive to
maintain than one."); Thomas J. Espenshade, The Economic Consequences of Divorce, 41 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 615,620 (1979) ("When many family members live together there are items
of nearly fixed costs (e.g., housing) that can be spread around so that the per capita cost of
maintaining a given standard of living is less than for a smaller family. When couples divorce
these benefits are reduced.").
197. Hutchings v. Hutchings, No. 054449S, 1993 WL 57741, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb.
22, 1993).
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VI. Recommendations
As discussed above, a number of problems arise at the crossroads between
interspousal torts and divorce. It is particularly difficult to recommend a
working solution to the problem because of the wide variations among the
states in the laws of tort, divorce, and procedure. Therefore, the
recommendations proposed here are broad and will only be desirable or feasible
in some jurisdictions.
A. Recommendations to Reform the Substantive Law
One potential solution, suggested by Professor Craig W. Dallon, is to
consider a limited sphere of marital misconduct in divorce proceedings.
198
There are two primary rationales for this approach: (1) tort law and criminal
law do not address some of the forms of misconduct most unique to the marital
context199 and (2) the injured spouse should be compensated for the financial
loss suffered as a result of the divorce.2°0 Claims of assault and battery, and
claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress (at least when accompanied
by physical injury) would arguably remain within the province of other areas of
the law, primarily tort law.20 1 This approach would establish minimum
standards of decency within the marriage. 20 2 Furthermore, it gives at least some
spouses, who cannot otherwise bring a separate tort action for financial reasons,
the opportunity to recover for injury.
Another potential solution is tort reform by devising a new cause of action
to deal with the misconduct not currently addressed, or inadequately addressed,
in other areas of the law. This approach was adopted to some extent in New
198. See Craig W. Dallon, The Likely Impact of the ALI Principles of the Law of Family
Dissolution on Property Division, 2001 BYU L. REv. 891, 919-20 (noting the problems with
the ALI's complete disregard of fault and recommending an intermediate approach).
199. See id. at 918 (recognizing that other areas of the law may be suitable to address
misconduct like battery but that "adultery, desertion, [and] alleged purely emotional abuse in
marriage" are not sufficiently addressed).
200. See id. at 919 ("The spouse who, through marital misconduct, precipitates the marital
breakdown causes financial loss to the other spouse.").
201. See id. (recognizing that some misconduct is not "inherently linked to the marital
relationship" and concluding that "not all conduct should qualify as marital misconduct or
fault").
202. See Lynn D. Wardle, Beyond Fault and No-Fault in the Reform of Marital
Dissolution Law, in RECONCEWING THE FAMILY 9, 26 (Robin Fretwell Wilson ed., 2006)
(criticizing the ALI's recommendation and encouraging divorce courts to bolster "community
standards of minimum acceptable spousal behavior").
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Jersey, where "battered-woman's syndrome" is distinctly recognized in tort.2 03
The new tort not only recognizes the unique parameters of the marital context,
but it also avoids some of the procedural problems otherwise present,
specifically the danger of the statute of limitations running prior to divorce.2 °4
Professor Barbara Bennett Woodhouse suggested a variation of this approach,
recommending the development of a new tort for "breach of spousal trust."
205
This cause of action would "authorize compensation for physical, emotional,




B. Recommendation to Reform the Procedural Law
Integrating alternative dispute resolution techniques into the contentious
divorce proceeding is another possibility. States should adopt a system in
which parties notify the court that they intend to pursue a tort claim in
connection with the marital relationship. If the parties are determined to bring
such a claim, the court suspends final resolution of the divorce proceeding
pending arbitration to resolve the issue of fault.20 7 The arbitrator supplies a
decision on the issue of liability for the charged wrongs, using the standards
normally applicable to unmarried individuals rather than the heightened
standards currently applied to married couples. On the issue of damages, the
arbitrator would provide a property split based solely on the tort claim (such as
a 65/35 distribution in favor of the injured spouse). Provided the arbitrator's
decision is supported by the evidence, the judge uses the arbitrator's split as a
starting point and makes the remaining distribution according to the normal
factors that drive equitable distribution.
An arbitration proceeding has a number of advantages over the ALI's
recommendation, which requires a separate tort suit. The main advantage is the
reduced financial cost incurred by the parties. Many couples are deterred from
bringing a civil suit because of the enormous financial burden subsequent
203. Cusseaux v. Pickett, 652 A.2d 789, 793 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1994), overruled on other
grounds by Giovine v. Giovine, 663 A.2d 109 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995).
204. See id. at 794 (establishing that battered-woman's syndrome allows the plaintiff to
combine the individual acts of misconduct as a continuing tort, thus avoiding the forfeiture of
older incidents).
205. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Sex, Lies, andDissipation: The Discourse ofFault in a
No-Fault Era, 82 GEO. L.J. 2525, 2566 (1994).
206. Id.
207. The court could still resolve issues that are not related to the distribution of property
and that require immediate resolution---such as child custody issues.
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litigation places on parties that have already taken a financial hit in divorce.2 °8
Arbitration proceedings are generally cheaper2°9 and would allow some parties,
otherwise barred from seeking compensation, to be made whole. Another
benefit of arbitration is the length of the proceeding. As discussed above, civil
litigation can take years to resolve and keep the parties entangled in a
contentious battle.21° In contrast, the arbitration proceeding is generally
quicker21l and, therefore, the divorce proceeding can be suspended for a short
period of time to resolve the tort claim.
The problem of the lesser-earning tortfeasor212 would all but disappear by
combining arbitration of torts and judicial resolution of divorce. No property
distribution or support award would be made until after the resolution of the
misconduct claim. Therefore, creditors cannot attach their claims to the award
ahead of time and the tortfeasor cannot circumvent liability by disposing of the
funds. Furthermore, if the arbitration award is made in terms of a percentile
split, the danger of leaving the tortfeasor completely insolvent is reduced.
An added benefit of the arbitration alternative is that the parties do not
have to "air their dirty laundry" in open court. One of the concerns of courts in
allowing interspousal litigation is that the intimacy of the relationship will be
exposed to public scrutiny.213 Protecting the accused spouse from humiliation
is cited as one of the justifications for limiting the application of tort suits in the
context of interspousal suits. 21 4  Submitting interspousal tort claims to
arbitration reduces the danger of unnecessary disclosure and allows the marital
activities to remain relatively private.
208. Supra notes 192-97 and accompanying text.
209. See NAT'L ARBITRATION FORUM, THE CASE FOR PRE-DIsPuTE ARBITRATION
AGREEMENTS: EFFECTIVE AND AFFORDABLE ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOR CONSUMERS 10 (2004)
(citing Lisa Brener, Cost and Value of Arbitration, 14 WORLD ARBITRATION & MEDIATION
REPORT 111 (2003)), available at www.arbitration-forum.com/rcontrol/documents/
ResearchStudiesAndStatistics/2004EmpiricalStudies.pdf (reporting that 89% of persons who
took advantage of arbitration procedures "found that [it] was less expensive than litigation").
210. Supra note 192 and accompanying text.
211. See U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, ARBITRATION: SIMPLER, CHEAPER, AND
FASTER THAN LITIGATION 19 (2005), available at www.adrforum.com/rcontrol/documents/
ResearchStudiesAndStatistics/2005HarrisPoll.pdf (indicating that 74% of users perceived that
arbitration proceedings were faster than courtroom litigation).
212. Supra Part V.C.
213. See Hakkila v. Hakkila, 812 P.2d 1320, 1325 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991) ("Any litigation
of a claim is certain to require exposure of the intimacies of married life.").
214. See id. ("In determining the scope of the tort of outrage in the marital context, it is
necessary to consider the privacy interests of the accused spouse.").
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The use of arbitration procedures to resolve personal injury claims has
been criticized as inconsistent with the policies and values of tort law.2"5
However, such criticism was based on the use of arbitration arising from a
contractual relationship.21 6 Consequently, central to the criticism was the
ability of the party with superior bargaining power to secure favorable
procedures or limitations on the proceeding, thereby challenging the fairness to
the other party.217 The dissolution of a marriage is not usually predicated on a
formal contract that establishes procedures for arbitration, and so the concern of
bargaining power is not realized. The danger of excessively limiting
opportunities for discovery and witness testimony218 may not be as problematic
in the context of a divorce. In the generic case, the facts and circumstances
surrounding marital torts will be less complex and require fewer discovery
requests than a typical suit between strangers with a contractual relationship.
VII. Conclusion
The American Law Institute's recommendation that aggrieved spouses
seek compensation in independent tort actions is likely to leave injured parties
without any remedy. A variety of procedural and financial hurdles often
prevent spouses from being able to institute a separate suit and have their claim
heard. Furthermore, spouses who are able to have their claim decided on the
merits encounter a higher standard for recovery than unmarried persons. This
Note does not mean to suggest that tort law is completely incapable of fulfilling
the objectives that were traditionally met by the use of fault in divorce.
However, in the current system the principles and rationales for no-fault
divorce are bleeding over into the application of tort law to divorcing
219spouses. In an attempt to smooth out the inequities of such a system, states
215. See Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Contracting with Torifeasors: Mandatory Arbitration
Clauses and Personal Injury Claims, 67 LAW & CoNTEmp. PROBs. 253,261-67,270-73 (2004)
(arguing that arbitration can deprive a personal injury plaintiff of the expansive procedural
protections of litigation and limit the available recovery in such a way that undermines the
purposes of tort law).
216. See id. at 254-55 ("Mandatory arbitration clauses have come to be used to compel
arbitration of personal injury claims arising between contracting parties.").
217. See id. at 262-63 (discussing the ways in which contracting parties can "eliminate or
severely limit" the basic rights that accompany litigation).
218. See id. (arguing that full discovery and opportunity to hear testimony are important to
prevent "a significant information imbalance").
219. See Hakkila v. Hakkila, 812 P.2d 1320, 1325-26 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991) ("A cautious
approach to the tort of intraiarital outrage also finds support in the public policy of New
Mexico to avoid inquiry into what went wrong in a marriage.").
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should consider integrating arbitration proceedings into divorce actions. Given
the circumstances, there is still "no winning," but at least the appropriate party
bears the greater degree of losing.

